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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2077 
___________ 
 
ROBERT MCCANN, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE BOROUGH OF MAGNOLIA; BETTY ANN COWLING-CARSON, 
HONORABLE MAYOR, BORO OF MAGNOLIA (PERSONALLY AND IN HER 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY); JOHN EVANS, CHIEF OF POLICE, BORO OF MAGNOLIA 
(PERSONALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY); OFFICER  SHERMAN, 
PATROLMAN, BORO OF MAGNOLIA (PERSONALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL 
CAPACITY); HON. DANIEL BERNARDIN, MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE, BORO 
OF MAGNOLIA (PERSONALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY); HOWARD 
LONG, PROSECUTOR, BORO OF MAGNOLIA (PERSONALLY AND IN HIS 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 14-cv-00170) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 21, 2014 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 5, 2014) 
 
___________ 
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OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Robert McCann, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his civil rights complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We will affirm. 
 In January 2013, McCann returned to his apartment in Magnolia, New Jersey, to 
discover that he had been evicted.  McCann contacted the Magnolia Police Department, 
which denied his request to file a complaint.  He also complained to Magnolia’s Mayor 
and Borough Counsel.  Two weeks later, McCann was permitted to return to the 
apartment, but several items of personal property were damaged or missing.  McCann 
filed a complaint with the Borough of Magnolia Municipal Court, which concluded that 
there was “no probable cause to sustain the charges.”   
 Approximately one year later, McCann filed a complaint in the District Court, 
alleging violations of his due process and equal protection rights.  He named as 
defendants the Borough of Magnolia, its Mayor, the Chief of Police and a police officer, 
a Municipal Court judge, and the Borough prosecutor.  The District Court reviewed the 
compliant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed it sua sponte for failure to 
state a claim, and concluded that amendment of the complaint would be futile.  McCann 
filed a timely notice of appeal.   
                                              
* The disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to 
state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint 
pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
See id.  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)).  If a complaint is subject to dismissal, “a district court must permit a 
curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”  Phillips 
v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 The District Court properly dismissed McCann’s complaint.  Relief may not be 
granted on McCann’s claim that a police officer improperly denied his request to file a 
criminal complaint and failed to investigate his eviction.  See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the 
prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”); Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that “[t]here is no statutory or common law right, much less a 
constitutional right, to an investigation.”).  Because no claim against the police officer 
survives, and because he does not allege their direct involvement, McCann cannot 
maintain claims against the Borough, its Mayor, and the Chief of Police.  See Williams v. 
West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that “West Chester cannot be 
vicariously liable . . . unless one of West Chester’s employees is primarily liable under 
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section 1983 itself.”); Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 
2007) (holding that plaintiff’s failure-to-train claim failed because facts did not establish 
an underlying constitutional violation).  Moreover, the judge and the prosecutor are 
immune from McCann’s suit for damages because their alleged actions were performed 
solely in their judicial and prosecutorial capacities.  See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 
(1991) (per curiam) (holding that judicial officers have absolute immunity from suit when 
acting within their official capacities); Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (stating that prosecutorial immunity bars suit against district attorneys for their 
decision to initiate a prosecution).  Finally, in light of the nature of the factual allegations 
set forth in McCann’s complaint, we further conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that allowing him leave to amend his complaint would 
have been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
